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desire to own this book, and economists and historians will wish to have the volume upon the shelves of their private collections.

**Washington, B. T.** *Frederick Douglass*. Pp. 365. Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs & Co., 1907.

See "Book Reviews."

**Williamson, C. C.** *The Finances of Cleveland*. Pp. 266. Price, \$2.00. New York: Columbia University Press, 1907.

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REVIEWS.

**Abbot, Henry L.** *Problems of the Panama Canal*. Pp. xii, 269. Price, \$1.50. New York: Macmillan Co., 1907.

The merit of General Abbot's book on the Panama Canal is attested by the fact that a second edition has been necessary within two years after the first edition appeared. As the first edition did not receive notice in *THE ANNALS* an estimate of the book seems desirable at the present time. The first sixty pages of the volume give a history of the project from the beginning of the French enterprise at Panama up to the adoption of the Panama location by the United States Government. Although this account by General Abbot is brief it is a clear statement of the more important facts. Those desiring a fuller history of the subject will consult the "Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for 1899-1901," which contains an admirable "History of Inter-oceanic Projects and Communications," that was prepared by Hon. Samuel Pasco, a member of the commission.

General Abbot's description of the physical conditions on the isthmus, his discussion of the Chagres River problem, and of the difficulties of disposing of the floods in the upper and lower Chagres Valley, constitute a most valuable treatise of those difficult engineering and hydrographic questions. He has the good fortune of being able to present technical problems in non-technical language. The last chapter of the book gives a description and critical estimate of the projects for the canal that were developed by the New Panama Canal Company, by the Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899-1901, and of the project that was recommended by the board of consulting engineers in 1906. The modifications of the design of the canal and in the details of the project that have been made since the beginning of 1906 are also pointed out.

Like nearly all of the distinguished American engineers who have studied the Panama Canal project, General Abbot favors the construction of a canal with locks. His views on this important and much debated question are stated as follows in the closing paragraph of his book: "In fine, well-established facts demonstrate that the conception of a sea-level construction is incompatible with the actual topographical and hydraulic conditions existing upon the isthmus. Forced upon the first French company by the commanding influence of M. de Lesseps, a diplomatist and not an engineer, it entailed financial ruin upon his associates. Revived, largely through the efforts of

Mr. Wallace, it has caused the loss of precious time since the work passed under the control of the United States. With abundant financial resources and unlimited time for construction, it may be considered 'feasible' from an engineering point of view to construct a sea-level canal, but when completed it must always remain inferior as a transit route, to the lake-type adopted."

Students of the canal project in its historical, political, economic and technical aspects will find General Abbot's work one that it would be well to read in connection with the more comprehensive and complete discussion contained in the "Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for 1899-1901" and in the "Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal, 1906." These two official reports are accompanied with numerous maps and charts which greatly enhance their value.

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**Alexander, E. P.** *Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative.*

Pp. xviii, 634. Price, \$4.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.

To a layman this book appeals as little short of epoch making in the history of military criticism. It gives detailed accounts of the battles and movements of the Army of Northern Virginia and of the battle of Chickamauga, in which the author, a brigadier-general in the Confederate army and chief of artillery, took part. He lays down the chessboard, places his men, and points out the moves that were made and should have been made with such consummate skill that one is strongly tempted to follow him in every detail. This, too, in a game of war when the movement for peace is so strong.

One of the most striking features of the book is its entire freedom from animus or partisan bias. It is very pleasing indeed to find an old soldier who, if he ever carried in his heart any of the bitterness of defeat, has lost it all and can now review the struggle as he might review the battle of Waterloo or the siege and storming of Port Arthur. If criticisms are meted out to all—and scarcely a man on either side escapes—it is not because of a desire to be impartial in their distribution, but because the author can see mistakes and has the courage to point them out.

The same man is not always at fault. If Stonewall Jackson is under a "spell" in the seven days' fighting, that does not dim the luster of his valley campaign and the masterful strategy of the second Manassas. If McClellan was a poor fighter, he was a splendid organizer. Perhaps Pope's general incapacity is hardly to be offset by the fact that he was a past master at boasting. The faults, as well as the virtues, of Longstreet are freely pointed out. He hardly suffers as much at the author's hands in the Gettysburg campaign as he has at the hands of others. On the whole, the author concludes that the loss of the battle, if any other result was ever possible, was mainly the fault of Lee, not because Lee took the blame on himself, but because a study of the battle has revealed his errors, mistakes which "he himself would have [pointed out] had he lived to write